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The road toward the enactment of federal product liability re-
form legislation has been a long one. The effort can be traced back to
an Interagency Task Force that began under President Ford in 1976
and concluded under President Carter in 1980. In late 1981, a major
effort to enact federal legislation began under the leadership of for-
mer Wisconsin Republican Senator Robert Kasten.'
For the last two Congresses, bipartisan product liability reform
has been an achievable goal in the United States Senate. Yet, in both
September 1992 and June 1994, a minority of members, many of
whom held key Senate leadership positions, filibustered the product
liability bill when supporters tried to bring it to the Floor. Both
times, proponents fell just short of the sixty votes needed to overcome
the filibuster.3
In the 104th Congress, the effort to enact liability reform legisla-
tion originated in the House of Representatives with a quick and suc-
cessful start. The success of the measure was due in large part to the
prominence of legal reform in the House Republican "Contract with
America." House Judiciary Committee Chairman Henry Hyde intro-
duced a bill on the opening day of the 104th Congress, January 4,
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1995.' Michael Oxley, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Commerce,
Trade, and Hazardous Materials of the House Commerce Committee
introduced a bill on February 13, 1995.1 Their committees held hear-
ings in February, 6 and the bills were subsequently combined and rein-
troduced as House Bill 956, the "Common Sense Product Liability and
Legal Reform Act of 1995."' The House effort culminated on March
10, 1995, with the approval of House Bill 956 by a vote of 265 to 161.8
Several days later, on March 15, 1995, bipartisan legislation was
introduced by West Virginia Democratic Senator John D. Rockefeller
IV, Republican Senator Slade Gorton of Washington, and others.'
The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation's
Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce, and Tour-
ism held hearings in April,' and quickly reported out a bill."' On
May 10, 1995, the Senate approved House Bill 956, as amended by
Senate Bill 565, the "Product Liability Fairness Act of 1995," by a vote
of sixty-one to thirty-seven.12
On March 14, 1996, members appointed by the House and Sen-
ate leadership agreed upon a conference report that resolved differ-
ences between the House and Senate bills.' The Senate passed the
conference report on House Bill 956, renamed the "Common Sense
Product Liability and Legal Reform Act of 1996,"l' on March 21, 1996,
by a vote of fifty-nine to forty. 5 The House passed it on March 29,
1996, by a vote of 259 to 158.16 The conference report was sent to
President Clinton on April 30, 1996, after a ceremony at the United
States Capitol that included brief statements in support of the report
by then Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole and House Speaker Newt
4. See Common Sense Legal Reform Act of 1995, H.R. 10, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995).
5. See Common Sense Product Liability Reform Act, H.R. 917, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995).
6. See H.R. REP. No. 64, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1995); H.R. REP. No. 63, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1995).
7. See Common Sense Product Liability and Legal Reform Act of 1995, H.R. 956,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
8. See 141 CONG. REc. H3027 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1995).
9. See Product Liability Fairness Act of 1995, S. 565, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
10. See S. REP. No. 69, supra note 1, at 14.
11. See id. at 15.
12. See 141 CONG. REc. S6407 (daily ed. May 10, 1995).
13. See H.R. CoNF. REp. No. 481, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996).
14. Id.
15. See 142 CONG. REc. S2590 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1996).
16. See 142 CONG. REc. H3204 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1996).
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Gingrich.'" President Clinton vetoed the conference report on May 2,
1996, marking the fifteenth veto of his presidency.'
This Article will briefly describe the history of the federal product
liability effort. The Article then focuses on the 1995-96 legislation,
and in particular the conference report on House Bill 956.19 The Ar-
ticle will show that the proposed federal product liability law would
provide fair and balanced common-sense rules that draw upon strong
mainstream academic support and are consistent with the laws of
many states. Furthermore, the Article will describe ways in which the
proposed legislation would benefit consumers and businesses, create
jobs, improve product safety, encourage innovation, and stimulate
economic growth. The Article concludes that federal liability reform
should be strongly supported.
I. HISTOIuCAL BACKGROUND
A. The Federal Interagenwy Task Force on Product Liability
Under Presidents Ford and Carter, a Federal Interagency Task
Force on Product Liability studied the problems of liability laws in-
tensely. The Task Force made two principal recommendations. First,
to achieve the goal of enabling small businesses to have a better and
fairer opportunity in the liability insurance market, the Task Force
recommended that federal legislation be enacted that would allow
businesses to form self-insurance pools. 20 This would require preemp-
tion of certain state insurance regulation. 21 The resulting legislation,
the Product Liability Risk Retention Act, became law in 1981.22 It was
extended to all liability coverage (with the exception of workers' com-
pensation) in 1986.23 The legislation helped to ensure not only com-
petitive markets, but also that any savings from the stabilization of the
tort system would flow to insureds, not to insurance companies. 24
17. See Sending a Message on Product Liability, WASH. POSr, May 1, 1996, at A6.
18. SeeJohn F. Harris, Clinton Vetoes Product Liability Measure, WASH. POST, May 3, 1996,
at A14; Neil A. Lewis, President Vetoes Limits on Liability, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1996, at Al;
Warren P. Strobel, Clinton Uses Human Props to Put a Spin on Liability Veto, WASH. TIMES, May
3, 1996, at A5; The Lawyers' Veto, WALL ST. J., May 3, 1996, at A12. In order to preserve a
record vote on the issue, the House attempted a veto override on May 9, 1996; it fell 23
votes short of passage.
19. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 481, supra note 13.
20. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCr LIABILIY, U.S. DEFP'T OF COMMERCE, FINAL
REPORT V-19 to V-21 (1976).
21. Id.
22. Product Liability Risk Retention Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 9745, 95 Stat. 949 (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3904 (1994)).




Second, the Task Force found that uncertainties in the current
product liability system create unnecessary legal costs, impede inter-
state commerce, and stifle innovation, among other problems.25 In
1978, the Task Force, after conducting an eighteen-month study, is-
sued a report that recommended the drafting of a model uniform
product liability law for use by the states. The report intimated that
reforms of the system would be enacted at the federal level if the states
did not enact the model law.26
B. The Model Uniform Product Liability Act
A final version of the model law, known as the Model Uniform
Product Liability Act,2 7 has been the basis for legislation in about nine
states. Unfortunately, the Uniform Act has not been applied uni-
formly. Instead, state legislatures have adopted provisions of the law
in a piecemeal fashion. This trend continued into 1995 with the en-
actment of various liability reform laws in Illinois,2" Texas,2 9 Indi-
ana,30 North Dakota," l New Jersey, 2 Oregon, 3 and Wisconsin,34
among other states.
C. Problems with a State-y-State Approach
One inherent problem with state product liability legislation,
apart from rules that differ from state to state, is that a state cannot
regulate product liability problems outside its borders. On average,
over seventy percent of the goods that are manufactured in a particu-
lar state are shipped and sold out of that state.33 For this reason, state
tort reform legislation, while useful, often has less than a thirty per-
cent "effectiveness" standard for that state's businesses. On the other
hand, all of a state's citizens who sue in the state are governed by the
state's product liability law. Thus, while enactment of product liability
legislation in individual states can be helpful, product liability is a mat-
ter of interstate commerce.
25. See S. REP. No. 69, supra note 1, at 26.
26. See 43 Fed. Reg. 14,612 (1978).
27. See Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979).
28. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, para. 5/2-622, -623, -1107.1, -1115.05, -1115.1, -1115.2,
-1116, -1205.1, -2104, -2105, -2106, -2106.5, -2108, -2109, 5/13-213 (Smith-Hurd 1996).
29. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.001 (West 1996).
30. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 33-1-1.5-1, -4, -9, -10, 344-34-4, -5, -6 (West 1996).
31. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 28-01.3-07 to -09, .4-01 to -04 (1995).
32. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A.:15-5.2, .3, .9 (West 1996).
33. OR. REV. STAT. § 18.537 (1995).
34. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.85 (West 1996).
35. See S. REp. No. 69, supra note 1, at 26.
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The Conference of State Supreme Court Justices, the National
Conference of State Legislators, and other credible sources believe
that the formulation of product liability law should be left solely to the
states.3 6 On the other hand, some state courts, despite their sensitivity
to states' rights, believe that a federal product liability law is appropri-
ate. These courts have recognized that federal liability legislation is
the only mechanism to ensure that fair and uniform law will be ap-
plied evenly throughout the United States.3 7
Furthermore, since 1986, the National Governors' Association
(NGA) has supported a federal product liability law.38 OnJanuary 31,
1995, for the third time, the NGA adopted a resolution calling for
Congress to enact a uniform federal product liability law.39  The
NGA's most recent resolution reads in pertinent part:
The National Governors' Association recognizes that the
current patchwork of U.S. product liability laws is too costly,
time-consuming, unpredictable, and counter productive, re-
sulting in severely adverse effects on American consumers,
workers, competitiveness, innovation and commerce.
36. See H.R. REP. No. 63, supra note 6, at 27; H.R. REP. No. 64, supra note 6, at 40-41; S.
RFP. No. 69, supra note 1, at 64-66.
37. In two separate opinions, the West Virginia Court of Appeals reflected on this issue.
In Games v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 897 (W. Va. 1991), the court stated:
State courts have adopted standards that are, for the most part, not predictable,
not consistent and not uniform. Such fuzzy standards inevitably are most likely to
be applied arbitrarily against out-of-state defendants. Moreover, this is a problem
that state courts are by themselves incapable of correcting regardless of surpass-
ing integrity and boundless goodwill. State courts cannot weigh the appropriate
trade-offs in cases concerning the national economy and national welfare when
these trade-offs involve benefits that accrue outside the jurisdiction of the forum
and detriments that accrue inside the jurisdiction of the forum.
Id. at 905. Earlier, in Blankenship v. General Motors Corp., 406 S.E.2d 781 (W. Va. 1991),
the court opined:
Indeed, in some world other than the one in which we live, where this Court were
called upon to make national policy, we might very well take a meat ax to some
current product liability rules. Therefore, we do not claim that our adoption of
rules liberal to plaintiffs comports, necessarily, with some Platonic ideal of perfect
justice. Rather, for a tiny state incapable of controlling the direction of national
law in terms of appropriate trade-offs among employment, research, develop-
ment, and compensation for the injured users of products, the adoption of rules
liberal to plaintiffs is simple self-defense.
Id. at 786.
38. See S. REP. No. 69, supra note 1, at 13. As Governor of Arkansas, President Clinton
twice sat on NGA committees that drafted and unanimously approved resolutions calling
for federal product liability reform. See Trial Lawyers' Triumph, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 1996,
at A16.
39. See S. REp. No. 69, supra note 1, at 13.
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Clearly, a national product liability code would greatly
enhance the effectiveness of interstate commerce. The Gov-
ernors urge Congress to adopt a federal uniform product lia-
bility code.4 °
Moreover, the strongly states' rights-oriented American Legisla-
tive Exchange Council (ALEC), the nation's largest bipartisan coali-
tion of state legislators with over 2400 members nationwide, supports
the enactment of federal product liability legislation.41 ALEC has sev-
eral times called on Congress to enact a federal product liability law.4 2
In February 1992 the Defense Research Institute (DRI), the prin-
cipal national organization of defense attorneys, reversed its long-
standing opposition and now supports federal product liability reform
legislation.4' The DRI previously supported reform on a state-by-state
basis.'
Interestingly, the Europeans began an effort to enact uniform
product liability law a year or two after the U.S. Congress first looked
at the subject in late 1981. In July 1985 the Council of the European
Community adopted a uniform product liability directive that is now
the law in thirteen European countries.45 Amazingly, it has been eas-
ier for these diverse European countries to cede their sovereignty in
this area than it has been for the U.S. Congress to agree on a uniform
law for the United States. In addition to Europe's adoption of a uni-
form code, Japan has enacted its first product liability law, which be-
came effective on July 1, 1995.46
D. Legislatures Versus Courts
Some consumer advocacy groups and plaintiffs' lawyers have ar-
gued that neither Congress nor state legislatures have any business in
reforming liability laws. They contend that the subject should be left
to the courts. Most recently, for example, President of the Association
of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA) Larry Stewart suggested to both
40. Id. at 13-14.
41. Id. at 14.
42. See id.
43. See Hearings on H.R. 1910 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer Protection, and
Competitiveness of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 451 (1994)
(statement of James S. Oliphant, President, Defense Research Institute).
44. See id.
45. See Directive on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative
Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for Defective Products, 28 O.J. EUR.
COMM. 29 (No. L210) (1985).
46. See MINP6 (Civil Code), Law No. 85 of 1994. See generally Mark A. Behrens & Daniel
H. Raddock, Japan's New Product Liability Law: The Citadel of Strict Liability Falls, but Access to
Recovery Is Limited ly Formidable Barriers, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 669 (1996).
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the House and Senate Commerce Committees that product liability
law should be left to the courts on a case-by-case basis.47
Proponents of reform, however, do not advocate a complete fed-
eral "takeover" of product liability law. But in a few core areas, Con-
gress is better suited to formulate sound national policy than courts
operating in fifty-one different jurisdictions.48 Proponents of a uni-
form federal product liability law believe that when courts formulate
law, in general, they only have the opportunity to hear from two attor-
neys who are focused on the interests of their clients. In contrast,
Congress has had the opportunity of hearing, as the records clearly
show, from a broad spectrum of interests. Congress can formulate
rules with the nation's interests in mind. Moreover, Congress has
been developing product liability rules for over a decade and a half.
The rules, of course, will only apply to cases filed after the date of
enactment of the law.49
Arguably, Congress has acted more deliberately than some courts
have. For over two hundred years, tort law had developed very slowly
in the courts, without abrupt change. In current times, however, ab-
rupt changes are occurring more frequently."° In addition, when
courts make law, their rules are formulated only after a case has been
decided by a jury. If the same "common-law" system were used to de-
termine speeds on highways, for example, the signs would be turned
backward and the speed limit subject to change daily-rules regard-
ing wrongdoing would be made only after a person was given a speed-
ing ticket.
47. See Common Sense Product Liability Reform Act: Hearings on H.R. 10 Before the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1995) (testimony of Larry S. Stewart,
President, Ass'n of Trial Lawyers of America); Common Sense Product Liability Reform Act:
Hearings on H.R. 10 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Hazardous Materials of the
House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1995) (testimony of Larry S. Stewart,
President, Ass'n of Trial Lawyers of America); Common Sense Product Liability Reform Act:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce, and Tourism of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (testimony of
Larry S. Stewart, President, Ass'n of Trial Lawyers of America).
48. Congress gave the District of Columbia its own judicial system by enacting the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-358, 84
Stat. 570 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
49. See S. REP. No. 69, supra note 1, at 25 (discussing the effective date of Senate Bill
565).
50. See, e.g., Simmons v. Monarch Mach. Tool Co., 596 N.E.2d 318, 320 n.3 (Mass.
1992) (imposing "super-strict" liability).
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II. PRINCIPAL PROVISIONS OF LIABILITY REFORM LEGISLATION IN THE
104TH CONGRESS
Congress has long exercised its authority in matters of interstate
commerce by enacting federal solutions to national problems.5 1 The
liability reform legislation considered by the 104th Congress was con-
sistent with this traditional area of activity.
A. Fair Rules for Product Seller, Lessor, and Renter Liability
Product sellers in about thirty states that wholesale or sell a prod-
uct are potentially liable for defects that they are neither aware of nor
able to discover.52 They are often drawn in as defendants in product
liability cases. Product sellers, however, rarely pay the judgment. In
more than ninety-five percent of the cases, the manufacturer bears
responsibility for the harm.5" The seller gets contribution or indemni-
fication from the manufacturer, and the manufacturer ultimately pays
the damages.5 4
This approach generates substantial, unnecessary legal costs.55 As
a consequence, the expense incurred by small businesses is passed on
to consumers in the form of higher prices.56 A more efficient alterna-
tive is for the claimant to sue the manufacturer directly and to sue the
product seller only if it was directly at fault.57 Approximately twenty
states already have changed their laws and now hold product sellers,
such as wholesalers and retailers, liable in tort only if they were negli-
51. S. REP. No. 69, supra note 1, at 27. The report cites the following examples: the
United States Grain Standards Act in 1916, 7 U.S.C. §§ 71-87, 111, 113, 241-73, 2209
(1994) (establishing uniform national standards for grain); the United States Cotton Stan-
dards Act in 1923, 7 U.S.C. §§ 51-65 (1994) (requiring uniform classifications for judging
quality or value of cotton); the Tobacco Inspection Act in 1935, 7 U.S.C. §§ 511-511r
(1994) (requiring compliance with uniform national classifications); the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act in 1938, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (1994) (establishing standards for safety and
labeling of drugs); the Consumer Product Safety Act in 1972, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2084
(1994) (setting uniform safety standards for consumer products); and the General Aircraft
Revitalization Act of 1994, 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (Supp. 1995) (establishing an 18-year na-
tional statute of repose for general aviation aircraft). S. REP. No. 69, supra note 1, at 27
nn.99-100.
52. S. REP. No. 69, supra note 1, at 31; seeW. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 705 (5th ed. 1984).
53. S. REP. No. 69, supra note 1, at 31.
54. Id.; see Kelly v. Htansom Bros., Inc. 331 A.2d 737, 740 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974).
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gent (for example, misassembled the product or failed to convey ap-
propriate warnings to customers).58
House Bill 956 would have held product sellers liable only for
their own negligence or for a product's failure to conform to an ex-
press warranty made by the product seller.59 A product seller, how-
ever, would have been held liable for the manufacturer's errors if the
manufacturer could not be brought into court in any state where the
action could have been brought or if the court determined that the
manufacturer lacked funds to pay the judgment.6 ° Thus, the provi-
sion would have ensured that an injured person could always sue
either the manufacturer or the product seller.
The legislation also provided relief for companies that rent or
lease products.6" These companies are subject in ten states and the
District of Columbia to liability for the tortious acts of their lessees
and renters, even if the rental company is not negligent and there is
no defect in the product.62 In these minority of states, a rental com-
pany is held vicariously liable for the negligence of its customers sim-
ply because the company owns the product and has given permission
for its use.63
House Bill 956 provided that companies that rent or lease prod-
ucts would be subject to liability in a product liability action for their
own negligence, but not the negligence of those beyond their
control.64
58. Id.; seeCOLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-402 (1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 7001 (1989);
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11.1 (Supp. 1995); IDAHO CODE § 6-1407 (1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
735, para. 5/2-621 (Smith-Hurd 1992) (formerly ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-621
(1989)); IOWA CODE § 613.18 (Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3306 (1994); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 411.340 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 2800.53 (West
1991); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 5-311 (1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 544.41 (West
1988); Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.762 (1988); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-21,181 (1995); NJ. STAT.
ANN. § 2A58C-9 (West 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-2 (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 2801.3-
04 (Supp. 1995); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.78 (Anderson 1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 20-9-9 (1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-106 (Supp. 1995); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 7.72.040 (West 1992).
59. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 481, supra note 13, at 6-7.
60. Id. at 7.
61. S. REP. No. 69, supra note 1, at 33 n.116.
62. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 17150-51 (West 1971); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-154a
(West 1987); D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-408 (1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 324.021(9)(b) (Supp.
1994) (exempts leased vehicles); IDAHO CODE § 49-2417 (1994); IOWA CODE § 321.493
(1985); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, §§ 1652-1653 (West Supp. 1995); MICH. COMP. LAws
ANN. § 257.401 (West Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. § 170.54 (1986); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw
§ 388 (McKinney 1986); R.I. GEN. LAws § 31-33-6, 31-33-7 (1995).
63. S. REP. No. 69, supra note 1, at 33.
64. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 481, supra note 13, § 103(c), at 7-8.
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B. Barring Claims Due to a Person's Use of Illegal Drugs or Drunkenness
In about eleven states, conduct such as abusing alcohol or drugs
does not preclude a person from recovering in a product liability ac-
tion, even if the drug or alcohol usage was a substantial cause of the
harm.65 For many years, product liability proposals in Congress have
sought to change this law. For example, House Bill 956 provided that
if the principal cause of an accident is the claimant's intoxification, he
would not be able to recover.66 The provision was based on a statute
enacted in the State of Washington.
7
The alcohol/drug defense represents good public policy.68 It lets
people know that if the effects of drugs or alcohol are the principal
cause of an accident, they will not recover through the product liabil-
ity system.69 The alcohol/drug defense also relieves law-abiding citi-
zens from the burden of subsidizing others' irresponsible conduct
through higher consumer prices.
C. Limiting Recovery for Those Who Misuse or Alter Products
Under the current product liability system, in some instances, de-
fendants are required to pay for harms caused by claimants who
grossly misuse products then turn to the "deep pocket" for compensa-
tion when they are injured. As a result, manufacturers and responsi-
ble consumers are unfairly punished. This system reflects bad policy,
and clearly deviates from traditional notions of fairness and individual
responsibility.
House Bill 956 placed responsibility for the reasonable use of
products where it is most effective-on the person using the prod-
UCt. 7 ° Following the law in the majority of states, 71 House Bill 956
provided that a claimant's damage award would be reduced by the
amount attributable to misuse or alteration of a product if the defend-
65. S. REP. No. 69, supra note 1, at 33.
66. Id.; see H.R. CONF. REP. No. 481, supra note 13, at 8.
67. S. REP. No. 69, supra note 1, at 33; see WASH. REV. CODE § 5.40.060 (West 1995).
68. S. REP. No. 69, supra note 1, at 33.
69. Id. The majority of states have laws that do not permit recovery in this situation. Id.
at 33 n. 17. Five states, Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia,
and the District of Columbia, continue to recognize contributory negligence as an absolute
defense. Id. Thirty-two states have adopted some form of modified comparative fault stan-
dard: Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indi-
ana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, NewJersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Da-
kota, Texas, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id.
70. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 481, supra note 13, § 105(a), at 8.
71. See VicrOR E. ScHwARTrz, COMPARATVE NEGLIGENCE app. b (3d ed. 1994).
1372 [VOL. 55:1363
FEDERAL PRODUCT LiABLiTY REFORM
ant could show that the misuse or alteration was in violation of ade-
quate warnings or instructions, or involved a risk of harm that should
have been known by an ordinary user of the product.72
D. Uniform Time Limits on Liability
1. Pro-Plaintiff "Discovery Rule" Statute of Limitations.-House Bill
956 would have established a two-year statute of limitations for prod-
uct liability actions that would begin to run when the claimant discov-
ered or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have discovered
both the harm that is the subject of the action and its cause. 73 This
provision would have opened courthouse doors to many whose right
to sue would no longer depend on which state statute happened to
apply to their claim.
House Bill 956 also would have alleviated the frequent hardship
to the families who have lost a loved one caused by the statute of limi-
tation periods in state wrongful death statutes. Unlike the prevailing
rule in most state wrongful death statutes, which bars claims after a
certain number of years following the date of the family member's
death, the bill would have preserved these claims for the "discovery"
period, that is, until two years after a surviving relative discovered, or
in the exercise of reasonable diligence could have discovered, the
cause of his loved one's death.74
2. Statute of Repose.-For over a decade and a half, scores of
small business owners have testified about the effect of liability for
very old machine tools and durable goods. The products have been
used safely for a substantial period of time and manufacturers are will-
ing to stand behind warranties they make about how long a product
will last. Nevertheless, as a result of liability from stale claims, some of
these companies are, by no fault of their own, falling behind competi-
tively because they are disadvantaged by liability rules that create an
artificial preference for newer, mostly foreign, industries.75
Principal competitors of the United States have enacted legisla-
tion recognizing that, at some point, an outer time limit on litigation
is reasonable and necessary. The new "pro-consumer" Japanese prod-
uct liability law and the European Community Product Liability Direc-
tive have a repose period of ten years that covers all products.76 In the
72. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 481, supra note 13, § 105(a), at 8.
73. See id. § 106(a), at 9.
74. Id.
75. See H.R. REP. No. 63, supra note 6, at 10-11; S. REP. No. 69, supra note 1, at 43.
76. See H.R. REP. No. 63, supra note 1, at 11; S. REP. No. 69, supra note 1, at 44.
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United States, a growing number of states (approximately seventeen)
have enacted statutes of repose ranging from eight years to a maxi-
mum of fifteen years, with the typical repose period between ten and
twelve years. 77 Recently, Congress enacted the General Aircraft Revi-
talization Act of 1994, which created a federal eighteen-year statute of
repose for general aviation aircraft.78
House Bill 956, which was not preemptive of state statutes,
elected a fifteen-year statute of repose. 9 This is fifty percent longer
than the Japanese law and the European Directive, and equal in
length to the longest state statute of repose, which is currently the law
in the State of Texas.8 ' The provision was limited to durable goods
and did not apply in cases involving a "toxic harm."81
E. Alternative Dispute Resolution
The legal system is inaccessible to many product liability claim-
ants because of its complexity and expense. The alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) procedure provision in House Bill 95682 would have
increased access to the legal system and sped resolution of legal dis-
putes so that money would be distributed to claimants more quickly.
77. Statutes of repose exist in the following states: ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-116.105(c)
(Michie 1987) ("anticipated life" of product); COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-403 (1987) (10
years); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-577a (1991 & Supp. 1995) (10 years); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-
11(b)(2) (1982 & Supp. 1995) (10 years); IDAHO CODE § 6-1403(2) (1990) ("useful safe
life" of product); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, para. 5/13-213(b) (Smith-Hurd 1992) (12 years
from date of first sale, or 10 years from date of sale to first user, whichever is shorter); IND.
CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-5(b) (West 1996) (10 years); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3303 (1994) ("use-
ful safe life" of product); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.310(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992)
(presumption that product is not defective if harm occurred five years after sale to first
consumer or eight years after manufacture); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.5805 (Callaghan 1986
& Supp. 1995) (if product in use for 10 years, plaintiff must prove prima facie case without
benefit of any presumption); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.03 (West 1988) ("useful life" of prod-
uct); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-224 (1995) (10 years); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.3-08(1) (Supp.
1995) (10 years); OR. REv. STAT. § 30.905(i) (1995) (10 years); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-
103(a) (1988 & Supp. 1995) (10 years); TEx. Cirv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.012 (West
Supp. 1995) (15 years); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.060(1) (West 1992) ("useful safe life"
of product).
78. General Aircraft Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298, § 3, 108 Stat. 1552
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (West Supp. 1995)). This law has resulted in production of
safer aircraft and the creation of thousands of new jobs, and has not been perceived as
unfair or challenged in the courts. See Geoffrey A. Campbell, Study: Business Booms After
Tort Reform Enacted, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1996, at 28 ("The light aircraft industry is taking off as
reduced liability encourages technological innovation.").
79. See H.R. CONF. REp. No. 481, supra note 13, § 106(b), at 9.
80. See TEx. Crv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.012 (West Supp. 1995).
81. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 481, supra note 13, § 106(b), at 9.
82. Id. § 107, at 9-10.
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House Bill 956 allowed either party to a dispute to offer to pro-
ceed pursuant to any voluntary and nonbinding ADR procedures es-
tablished in the law of the state where the action is brought or under
the rules of the court in which the action is maintained.8" The legisla-
tion would have required the offer to be made within sixty days after
service of the initial complaint or the applicable deadline for a re-
sponsive pleading, whichever is later.' There would have been no
penalty on a party who refuses to proceed to ADR.85
The ADR provision would have been especially beneficial for per-
sons with smaller claims, because they frequently are unable to afford
or obtain lawyers to represent them in expensive courtroom litigation.
Such plaintiffs more easily can secure attorneys to represent them in
ADR proceedings, which are free of cumbersome rules of procedure
and evidence and do not require the use of expensive expert
witnesses.86
F. Punitive Damages-Clear and Basic Rules for Quasi-Criminal
Punishment
1. In General.-The U.S. Supreme Court has observed that puni-
tive damages have "run wild" in the United States,jeopardizing funda-
mental constitutional rights.87 The Court has held that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes a substantive




86. William Fry, Executive Director of HALT, a nonprofit legal reform organization
supported by 70,000 individual members nationwide, testified before the Consumer Af-
fairs, Foreign Commerce, and Tourism Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Com-
merce, Science, and Transportation that ADR mechanisms are "a way to lower costs,
simplify procedures and achieve fairness through avoidance of technical rules of law." S.
REP. No. 69, supra note 1, at 29. He said that HALT supports the use of ADR mechanisms
to allow consumers to handle their own legal affairs. See id.
87. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991); see also Honda Motor
Corp. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2340 (1994) (stating that punitive damages "pose an acute
danger of arbitrary deprivation of property," raising serious due process concerns).
88. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1604 (1996); see also TXO Prod.
Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 458 (1993); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 499
U.S. at 23-24; Oberg, 114 S. Ct. at 2335; see also Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Dispo-
sal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 276 (1989) ("[D]ue process imposes some limits on jury awards of
punitive damages, and it is not disputed that a jury award may not be upheld if it was the
product of bias or passion, or if it was reached in proceedings lacking the basic elements of
fundamental fairness"). In Browning-Ferris, the Court did not squarely address the issue of
whether the Due Process Clause places outer limits on the size of punitive damages be-
cause the issue had not been preserved for appeal. Id. at 276-77; cf Pulla v. Amoco Oil Co.,
72 F.3d 648, 661 (8th Cir. 1995) (opinion by retired Supreme CourtJustice Byron White)
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the Constitution provides procedural limits on when and how punitive
damages may be awarded. 9
Some opponents of punitive damage reform have obscured a very
basic fact: punitive damages are punishment.9 ° Punitive damages de-
veloped out of English law to serve as a "helper" to the criminal law,
and the focus was, and should be on, conduct that was of such a pub-
licly egregious nature that it should be subject to criminal punish-
ment.91 They are not intended to compensate people for something
they have lost; that purpose is accomplished by compensatory dam-
ages.92 Nevertheless, unlike the criminal law system, in many states
there are virtually no standards for when punitive damages may be
awarded and no clear guidelines as to their amount-good behavior is
swept in with the bad.93
The unpredictable nature of the current system has resulted in
overdeterrence and has inhibited product innovation. a4 A Confer-
ence Board study of corporate executives reported that fear of liability
suits prompted thirty-six percent of the firms studied to discontinue a
product and thirty percent to withhold a new product.95 Clearly, ra-
tional rules are needed to promote innovation and responsible manu-
facturing practices, while at the same time providing assurances that
wrongdoers will be justly punished and deterred from future
misconduct.
House Bill 956 incorporated the basic elements of any criminal
law. First, it defined the "crime," or the offense that deserves punish-
ment. 6 Second, it provided for clear standards of proof so that
judges and juries can appreciate that they are imposing punishment
for reprehensible conduct, and not merely negligence.97 Finally, and
(striking down punitive damages award as "excessive, unreasonable and violative of due
process").
89. In Oberg, 114 S. Ct. at 2341, a case involving an all-terrain vehicle that flipped over
when an inebriated plaintiff tried to drive it up a hill, the Court struck down a punitive
damages award on the ground that Oregon law violated due process, because it did not
provide an opportunity for meaningful appellate review of the size of punitive damages
awards. Id.
90. DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.9, at 204 (1973).
91. Id. § 3.9, at 204-05.
92. Id. § 3.1, at 135-38.
93. Id. § 3.9, at 219-20.
94. For example, a 1992 Science magazine article reported that at least two companies
have delayed AIDS vaccine research and another company abandoned one promising ap-
proach as a result of liability concerns. Jon Cohen, Is Liability Slowing AIDS Vaccines?, Sci-
ENCE, Apr. 10, 1992, at 168-69.
95. See S. REP. No. 69, supra note 1, at 36.
96. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 481, supra note 13, § 103, at 6-8.
97. Id. § 108(a), at 10 (imposing a "clear and convincing evidence" standard).
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most importantly, it defined the potential judgment or "sentence."98
At present, punitive damages law fails these requirements, as evi-
denced by the Supreme Court's concern about punitive damages that
"run wild."99
2. Defining When Punitive Damages May Be Awarded.-Under
House Bill 956, punitive damages would have been awarded only if
the plaintiff proved by "clear and convincing evidence" that the de-
fendant violated the standard of "conscious, flagrant indifference to
the rights or safety of others."100 The "clear and convincing evidence"
burden of proof standard represents a "middle ground" between the
burden of proof standard ordinarily used in civil cases ("preponder-
ance of the evidence"), and the criminal law standard ("beyond a rea-
sonable doubt"), Ot It reflects the quasi-criminal nature of punitive
damages. The standard is now law by statute or decision in twenty-
eight states and the District of Columbia,102 and has been recom-
mended by each of the principal academic groups to analyze the law
of punitive damages since 1979, including the American Bar Associa-
tion, the American College of Trial Lawyers, and the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.1 03 The Supreme
98. Id. § 108(b), at 10 (setting out limits on punitive damage awards).
99. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 17 (1991).
100. Id. § 108(a), at 10.
101. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 481, supra note 13, § 108(a), at 10-11.
102. AL. CODE § 6-11-20 (1993); ALASKA STAT. § 09-17-020 (1994); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3294(a) (West 1970 & Supp. 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 51.12-5.1(b) (Supp. 1995); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 668A.I (West 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701(c) (1994); Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 411.184(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20 (West 1988 &
Supp. 1995); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65(1)(a) (Supp. 1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-
221(5) (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-005(1) (Michie Supp. 1995); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A15-5.12 (West 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § ID-15(b) (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-
11 (Supp. 1995); OHIO REv'. CODE ANN. § 2307.80(A) (Anderson 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 23, § 9.1 (West Supp. 1995); OR. REv. STAT. § 18.537 (1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-33-
135 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-1-4.1 (1987); TEX. Cxv. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003 (West 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1 (1992); Linthicum v.
Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 675, 681 (Ariz. 1986); Jonathan Woodner Co. v.
Breeden, 665 A.2d 929, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Masaki v. General Motors Corp., 780 P.2d
566, 575 (Haw. 1989); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Armstrong, 442 N.E.2d 349, 362-63 (Ind.
1982); Tuttel v. Raymond, 494 A-2d 1353, 1363 (Me. 1985); Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, 601
A.2d 633, 657 (Md. 1992); Hodges v. S.C. Toof& Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 (Tenn. 1992);
Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 458 (Wis. 1980). One state, Colorado, re-
quires proof beyond a reasonable doubt in punitive damages cases. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-
25-127(2) (1987).
103. See AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, SPECIAL COMM. ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES OF THE AM. BAR
Ass'N SECTION ON LITIGATION, PuNITIvE DAMAGES: A CONSTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION 19 (Am.
Bar Ass'n 1986) [hereinafter ABA REPORT]; AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAwYERs REP. ON
PUNTVE DAMAGES OF THE COMM. ON SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
15-16 (1989) [hereinafter ACTL REPORT]; 2 ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL IN-
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Court has recognized the merits of the "clear and convincing evi-
dence" burden of proof standard in punitive damages cases.104
3. Making the Punishment Proportional to the Harm. -Perhaps most
importantly, House Bill 956 put reasonable parameters on the amount
of punitive damages awarded to help assure that punishment is pro-
portional to harm. It permitted punitive damages to be awarded
against larger businesses up to the greater of two times a plaintiffs
compensatory damages (economic and noneconomic loss), or
$250,000.105 It also recognized that smaller businesses and organiza-
tions, as well as individuals, need special protection from excessive pu-
nitive damages. The legislation thus set forth the maximum amount
of punitive damages recoverable against an individual or small busi-
ness as the lesser of two times the amount awarded to the claimant for
economic and noneconomic losses, or $250,000. °6 Judges would
have been permitted to augment the punitive damages award against
a larger business up to the amount of the jury verdict by finding the
"proportionate" award "insufficient to punish the egregious conduct
of the defendant." 07 This provision was a limited measure intended
to be applied only in cases when the defendant's misconduct was ex-
traordinarily harmful and far exceeded "conscious, flagrant indiffer-
ence to the safety of others.""0 8
The proportionality requirements in House Bill 956, as in the
criminal law, would have helped ensure that the punishment is pro-
portional to the harm. "Mainstream" academic groups, including the
American Bar Association and the American College of Trial Lawyers,
have recommended that punitive damages be awarded in proportion
JURY-REPORTERS' STUDY 248-49 (Am. Law Inst. 1991) [hereinafter ALI REPORTERS' STUDY];
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM LAW COMMIS-
SIONERS' MODEL PUNiTVE DAMAGES ACT § 5 (approved by uniform law commissioners on
July 18, 1996) [hereinafter UNIFORM LAw COMMISSIONERS' MODEL PUNITIVE DAMAGES ACT].
See genera!/y Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, The American Law Institute's Reporters'
Study on Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury: A Timely Call for Punitive Damages Reform,
30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 263 (1993).
104. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 n.11 (1991) (stating that
"there is much to be said in favor of a State's requiring, as many do.... a standard of 'clear
and convincing evidence'"). Ultimately, the Court rejected this higher level of proof in
cases that meet constitutional scrutiny in favor of a lesser standard "buttressed ... by the
procedural and substantive protections." Id.
105. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 481, supra note 13, § 108(b), at 10.
106. See id.
107. Id.
108. Id. § 108(a), at 10.
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to actual damages.'19 Furthermore, approximately one-quarter of the
states have enacted legislation to address the problem of excessive pu-
nitive damages, most recently including Illinois, Indiana, New Jersey,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Texas.' 10 House Bill 956 did not pre-
empt more restrictive state laws limiting punitive damages."'
4. Bifurcation. -House Bill 956 also would have made a proce-
dural reform called "bifurcation," which a number of states have en-
acted.' 12 At either party's request, the trial may be divided so that the
proceedings on punitive damages would be separate from and subse-
quent to the proceedings on compensatory damages. Judicial econ-
omy is achieved by having the samejuy determine both compensatory
damages and punitive damages issues.
109. See ABA REPORT, supra note 103, at 64-66 (recommending that punitive damage
awards in excess of three-to-one ratio to compensatory damages be considered presump-
tively "excessive"); ACTL REPORT, supra note 103, at 15 (proposing that punitive damages
be awarded up to twice compensatory damages or $250,000, whichever is greater); ALI
REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 103, at 258-59 (endorsing concept of ratio coupled with al-
ternative monetary ceiling).
110. ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 735, para. 5/2-1115.05 (Smith-Hurd 1995) (punitive damages
limited to three times amount of claimant's economic damages); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-34-
5 (1995) (punitive damages limited to the greater of three times actual damages or
$50,000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A.15-5.14 (West 1995) (punitive damages limited to five times
amount of claimant's compensatory damages or $350,000, whichever is greater); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1D-25 (1995) (punitive damages limited to three times amount of claimant's com-
pensatory damages or $250,000, whichever is greater); OKLA. S.B. 263 (exemplary damages
may not exceed the greatest of $500,000, twice the amount of actual damages awarded, or
the increased financial benefit derived by defendant or insurer as a direct result of the
injurious conduct); TEx. Crv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.008 (West 1995) (limits puni-
tive damages awards to $200,000 or two times economic damages plus an amount equal to
any noneconomic damages up to $750,000). Other states have also capped punitive dam-
age awards. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-102(1)(a) (1995) (punitive award may not
exceed compensatory damages); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-204b (West Supp. 1992) (punitive
award permitted up to twice the compensatory damages); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(1) (a)
(West Supp. 1992) (punitive damages may be awarded up to three times compensatory
damages unless "clear and convincing evidence" is presented by the plaintiff to show that a
higher award is not excessive); NFv. PEv. STAT. § 42.005 (1991) (punitive damages awards
permitted up to $300,000 in cases in which compensatory damages are less than $100,000
and to three times the amount of compensatory damages in cases of $100,000 or more);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32.03.2-11(4) (1995) (permitting punitive damages up to twice com-
pensatory damages, or $250,000, whichever is greater); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-38.1
(Michie 1994) (punitive damages permitted up to a maximum of $350,000).
111. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 481, supra note 13, § 108(b)(3)(D), at 11. See generally
Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, Federal Product Liability Reform Legislation Is Consistent
with Virginia Law and Should Be Strongly Supported, 4 GEO. MASON U. L. REv. 279 (1996)
(discussing the burden of proof required to establish liability and the liability standard for
recovery of punitive damages under H.B. 956).
112. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 481, supra note 13, § 108(c), at 11-12.
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Bifurcated trials are equitable, because they prevent evidence that
is highly prejudicial and relevant only to the issue of punishment from
being heard byjurors and improperly considered when they are deter-
mining basic liability (for example, the net worth of a company or the
wealth of a defendant). Bifurcation also helpsjurors "compartmental-
ize" a trial, allowing them to more easily separate the burden of proof
that is required for compensatory damage awards (proof by a prepon-
derance of the evidence) from a higher burden of proof (proof by
clear and convincing evidence) for punitive damages.
Recognizing these benefits, some courts have recently required
bifurcation as a matter of common-law reform.1 13 Other states have
made similar changes through court rules or legislation." 4 This re-
form is supported by the American Law Institute's Reporters' Study,
the American Bar Association, the American College of Trial Lawyers,
and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws.
1 5
G. Balanced Rules for Joint Liability
The rule of joint liability, commonly called joint and several lia-
bility, provides that when two or more persons engage in conduct that
might subject them to individual liability and their conduct produces
a single, indivisible injury, each defendant will be liable for the total
amount of damages.11 6 The Senate Committee on Commerce, Sci-
ence, and Transportation observed that the system is "unfair and [it]
blunts incentives for safety, because it allows negligent actors to
under-insure and puts full responsibility on those who may have been
only marginally at fault."' 17 Thus, ajury's specific finding that a de-
fendant is minimally at fault is overridden and the minor player in the
lawsuit bears an unfair and costly burden."'
113. See Transportation Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 30 (Tex. 1994) (adopting "the
requirement of bifurcated trials in punitive damages cases"); Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co.,
833 S.W.2d 896 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that "where punitive damages are sought, the court,
upon motion of defendant, shall bifurcate the trial").
114. See, e.g., CAL. Crv. CODE § 3295(d) (West Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20
(West Supp. 1995); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65(1)(a) (Supp. 1995).
115. See ABA REPORT, supra note 103, at 19; ACTL REPORT, supra note 103, at 18-19; ALI
REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 103, at 255 n.41; Uniform Law Commissioners' Model Puni-
tive Damages Act, supra note 103, § 11.
116. See Coney v.J.L.G. Indus., Inc., 454 N.E.2d 197, 204 (Il. 1983) (definingjoint and
several liability).
117. S. REP. No. 69, supra note 1, at 45. See generally Senator Larry Pressler & Kevin V.
Schieffer, Joint and Several Liability: A Case for Reform, 65 DENV. U. L. REv. 651 (1988) (dis-
cussing doctrine of joint and several liability and offering possible reforms).
118. Id.
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Joint and several liability is extremely harmful to society. For ex-
ample, it has caused suppliers of raw materials and component parts
to refuse to supply manufacturers of medical devices. As a result, pa-
tients who need medical devices suffer. It has also caused manufactur-
ers of protective sporting goods equipment, such as safety helmets, to
withdraw products from the market or to be chilled from introducing
new products.1 19 Recognizing the need for reform of this unfair doc-
trine, at least thirty-three states have abolished or modified the princi-
ple of joint and several liability.1 2 0
House Bill 956 adopted a balanced approach between those who
call for the abolition of joint liability and those who wish to leave it
unchecked. The legislation eliminated joint liability for
"noneconomic damages" (such as damages for pain and suffering or
emotional distress), while permitting the states to retain full joint lia-
bility with respect to economic losses (for example, lost wages, medi-
cal expenses, and substitute domestic services).2 This means that
the legislation would have held each defendant liable for
noneconomic damages in an amount proportional to its percentage
of fault for the harm.122 This "fair share" rule was based on a joint
liability reform enacted in California through a ballot initiative ap-
proved by the majority of voters in 1986.125 The same approach was
enacted by the Nebraska legislature in 1991.124
H. Creating Incentives for a Safe Workplace
Workers' compensation statutes have essentially two purposes: to
provide an employee injured in the course of employment with a
quick and inexpensive way to recover for his injury, and to maximize
the incentive for employers to maintain a safe workplace.1 2 5 In most
states, however, the incentive for employers to ensure workplace safety
has been substantially undermined. In these states, if an employee
119. Id. at 46.
120. See SciswATz, supra note 71, app. b.
121. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 481, supra note 13, § 110(a), (b)(1), at 12.
122. The legislation provided that responsibility for a claimant's harm would be appor-
tioned in reference to all persons responsible for the plaintiff's injury, whether or not such
person was a party to the action. See i&. § 110(b) (2), at 12. This position is sound public
policy and reflects the trend in the tort law of the states. See, e.g., DaFonte v. Up-Right,
Inc., 828 P.2d 140, 145 (Cal. 1992) (stating that no defendant shall have joint liability for
noneconomic damages); Fabre v. Matin, 623 So. 2d 1182, 1185-86 (Fla. 1993) (stating that
"for purposes of non-economic damages a plaintiff should take each defendant as he or
she finds them").
123. CAL. CIv. CODE ANN. § 1431.2 (West Supp. 1996).
124. NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-21,185.10 (1995).
125. S. REP. No. 69, supra note 1, at 49.
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has a successful product liability claim against a manufacturer or prod-
uct seller, his employer can recover the amount of workers' compen-
sation benefits paid to the employee from the product liability
damage award, even if the employer is responsible for the injury.' 21 If
the employee obtains product liability damages against the manufac-
turer, the employer takes back the amount of workers' compensation
it paid to the employee.1 27 This result occurs even when the em-
ployer's negligence has been a principal cause of the accident. Work-
ers' compensation experts have vehemently criticized this rule,
because it has "set[ ] . . . off a flood of confusion and litigation. "128
House Bill 956 would have reversed this effect and modified state
law in a very positive way by placing a private incentive on employers
to keep their workplaces safe. 129 In sum, if an employer was at fault in
causing a workplace injury, it would bear the costs of workers'
compensation.
III. BIomATERIS AcCESs ASSURANCE
Each year millions of citizens depend on the availability of im-
plantable medical devices, such as pacemakers, heart valves, artificial
blood vessels, and hip and knee joints. The availability of these de-
vices is critically threatened, however, because suppliers have ceased
supplying raw materials and component parts to medical implant
manufacturers. A 1994 study by Aronoff Associates concluded that
there are significant numbers of raw materials that are "at risk" of
shortages in the immediate future.' Suppliers have found that the
cost of responding to litigation related to medical implants far ex-
ceeds potential sales revenues, even though courts are not finding
suppliers liable.'
House Bill 956 would have helped prevent a public health crisis
by limiting the liability of biomaterials suppliers to instances of genu-
ine fault. It would have also established a procedure to ensure that
126. Id. The employer assumes the employee's rights against the manufacturer by
subrogation.
127. See id.
128. See ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION FOR OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND
DEATH § 76.36 (desk ed. 1991) (discussing the California approach that deducts compensa-
tion from an employer's third-party recovery).
129. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 481, supra note 13, at 12-14.
130. See ARONOFF ASSOCS., MARKET STUDY. BIOMATERIALS SUPPLY FOR PERMANENT MEDI-
CAL IMPLANTS (Mar. 1994).
131. See generally Edward M. Mansfield, Reflections on Current Limits on Component and Raw
Materials Supplier Liability and the Proposed Third Restatement, 84 Ky. L.J. 221, 235-37 (1995-
96).
1382 [VOL. 55:1363
FEDERAL PRODUCT LiAirTy REFORM
suppliers could avoid litigation without incurring heavy legal costs.
The provision did not in any way diminish the existing liability of im-
plantable medical device manufacturers.13 The provision was the
subject of hearings and enjoyed strong bipartisan support. 133
CONCLUSION
The current product liability system in the United States is an
example of what is wrong, not right, with our legal system. We need
reasonable rules that will separate the bad from the good. We need a
system that has predictability-that will encourage appropriate con-
duct. The "real" consumers of America, those who purchase and use
products on a daily basis, will benefit by getting the products that they
need and by no longer having to pay unfair and unreasonable "prod-
uct liability taxes." Jobs will be created. Federal product liability legis-
lation can provide these results, while preserving a legal system that
will target dangerous and defective products.
After a decade and a half of debate and learning about the sub-
ject, federal product liability legislation does carefully balance and
meet these goals.
132. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 481, supra note 13, §§ 201-206, at 14-23.
133. No minority position was taken in regard to this provision of the Senate bill. See S.
REP. No. 69, supra note 1, at 51-52, 56-80.
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